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Research has shown that reminders of mortality lead people to engage in defenses to minimize the anxiety such thoughts could
arouse. In accord with this notion, younger adults reminded of mortality engage in behaviors aimed at denying vulnerability to
death. However, little is known about the eﬀects of mortality reminders on older adults. The present study examined the eﬀect of
reminders of death on older adults’ subjective life expectancy. Mortality reminders did not signiﬁcantly impact the life expectancy
estimatesofold-oldadults.Remindersofdeathdidhoweverleadtoshorterlifeexpectancyestimatesamongyoung-oldparticipants
low in neuroticism but longer life expectancy estimates among young-old participants high in neuroticism, suggesting that this
group was most defensive in response to reminders of death.
1.Introduction
Increasing age brings increased awareness that one’s remain-
ing lifetime is dwindling. Older adults experience increas-
ingly frequent reminders of mortality due to their own
declining health and the deaths of friends and family mem-
bers. Does this psychological proximity to death increase
anxiety and defensiveness among older individuals, or
serve as the impetus to develop greater comfort with and
acceptance of their mortality?
Research examining self-reported fear of death across
the lifespan has produced mixed results. Younger adults
consistently report higher fear of death than older adults
[1, 2], yet it remains unclear whether mortality-related
concerns continue to decrease or remain stable in later life.
Some studies indicate that fear of death continues to decline
throughout later life [3]. However, a meta-analysis of this
research concluded that fear of death declines from middle
age to old age, but among older adults, age no longer reliably
predicts self-reported fear of death [4]. Age diﬀerences may
dependonthespeciﬁcaspectofdeathanxietybeingassessed.
Cicirelli [5] reported that individuals in mid-old age
(75–84) reported greater fears concerning loss of the body
(e.g. cremation or bodily decay after death) than those in
young-old age (60–74), but the two groups did not diﬀer
in reported fears concerning the “unknown” (e.g. what
constitutes the afterlife; what it means to cease existing).
Research available to date thus provides an incomplete and
somewhat puzzling picture of older persons’ concerns about
death.
1.1. Terror Management Theory. Terror management theory
(TMT)[6,7]providesanalternativeapproachtothestudyof
death anxiety. The theory posits that humankind’s capacity
for awareness of their inevitable death creates the potential
for devastating anxiety that is managed by an anxiety-
buﬀering system consisting of a cultural worldview, self-
esteem, and close relationships. The cultural worldview pro-
videsaconceptionofrealityandasetofguidelines forvalued
behavior shared by the culture’s inhabitants. Following these
guidelines provides structure within an otherwise chaotic
world, a sense of belongingness, and literal immortality (e.g.
entry into heaven, reincarnation, or other form of afterlife)
and/or symbolic immortality (e.g., job promotions, having2 Journal of Aging Research
a park or building named after one’s family). Meeting or
exceeding culturally constructed standards of value gives
the individual self-esteem, the feeling that one is a valuable
contributor to a meaningful universe. Close relationships
harken back to the security provided by early attachments to
one’s parents and are essential for the maintenance of both
self-esteem and faith in one’s worldview. Together, cultural
worldview, self-esteem, and close relationships provide a
protective shield against the potential for anxiety that results
from awareness of the inevitability of death.
Support for TMT comes from a large body of research
showing that when people are reminded of death (mortality
salience, MS), they show increased commitment to and
defense of their worldviews, self-esteem, and close relation-
ships (see [8] for a recent review). For example MS has been
shown to lead to more positive reactions toward those who
praise one’s worldview and more negative reactions toward
those who criticize it [9], more self-esteem striving [10], and
greater reports of attraction to romantic partners [11]. A
recentmeta-analysisbyBurkeandcolleagues[12]found that
MS eﬀects are highly reliable and yield moderate-to-large
eﬀects (r = .35, d = .75) on a wide range of attitudinal,
behavioral, and cognitive dependent variables.
The pursuit of faith in one’s worldview, self-esteem, and
close relationships are referred to as distal defenses because
they bear no direct or logical connection to the problem of
death, but rather, provide protection by enabling people to
construe themselves as valued contributors to a meaningful
universe. Proximal defenses, on the other hand, refer to
defensive responses that deal with the problem of death in
a direct and seemingly logical way. Research has shown that
reminders of death also increase proximal defenses, such
as increasing one’s interest in exercise [13] and believing
that one possesses characteristics associated with a long life
expectancy [14].
1.2. TMT and Aging. As people age, it is likely that they
become less able to meet many of the standards that pre-
viously provided them with self-esteem. This is particularly
problematic within Western culture, where many central
achievements include success in the areas of career, ﬁnances,
and physical appearance, all of which are more diﬃcult
to accomplish in later life. With advancing age, people
are also likely to witness changes in mainstream cultural
worldviews, which could result in decreased consensual
validation of older adults’ cultural worldview, providing
fewer opportunities for boosting self-esteem and resulting
in drastic changes in the anxiety-buﬀering system. See
McCoy et al. [15] for a theoretical exploration of TMT and
aging.
In contrast to the suggestion of psychological deteriora-
tion and struggle in later life, there is abundant empirical
support for the idea that older adults developed methods
for adapting to the changes inherent in later life. A growing
body of research suggests that older adults are increasingly
focused on positive information and experiences, while
attending less to negative information [16]. As noted above,
the literature [1–4] also suggests that older adults generally
report lower levels of death anxiety than younger adults,
although the details of this pattern are not yet completely
clear.
Although many people report that they do not fear
death, research suggests that younger adults’ self-reported
fear of death is not predictive of responses to MS induc-
tions in terror management studies [17]. This raises the
possibility that even though older persons report lower fear
of death on explicit measures, they may still experience
death anxiety and respond defensively to reminders of death.
Because TMT posits that individuals with poorly function-
ing anxiety-buﬀering systems would be especially suscep-
tible to the inﬂuence of mortality reminders, one might
expect that older adults would be an especially vulnerable
group.
Initial TMT research with older adults indicates that
older adults do not respond to reminders of death with the
same distal defenses that younger persons use. Speciﬁcally,
following an MS induction, younger adults were more puni-
tivetowardsindividualsbreakingsocialnorms,whereasolder
participants were more lenient towards moral transgressors
[18]. However, this eﬀect only emerged reliably when the
reminder of death was very subtle. In other studies, older
adultsdidnotshowtheincreasedtendencytostructuresocial
information in a simplistic manner as displayed by younger
adults reminded of death [19] but did show increased
generativity striving which was not found in younger adults
[20].
In studies of proximal defensiveness [21], older par-
ticipants indicated decreased interest in health promoting
behavior when death was in focal attention, in direct
contrast to younger and middle-aged adults who showed
more interest in health information after death reminders.
Conversely, when thoughts of death were no longer in
focal attention, older adults with low self-esteem reported
increased intention to engage in health behaviors after MS
but those with high self-esteem were not inﬂuenced by MS.
However, it should be noted that older adults in these last
two studies ranged in age from 51 to 65 years, providing an
incomplete picture of terror management processes in later
life.
The present study assessed the eﬀect of reminders of
death on older adults’ use of what is perhaps the most direct
and simple form of proximal defense—simply believing that
death is far away and that one has many remaining years
to live. An older adult who has come to accept mortality
would be more likely to provide a realistic estimate of his
or her lifespan, whereas someone who remains fearful of,
or uncomfortable with, death would most likely engage in
the proximal defense of denying the event via longer life
expectancy estimates. Indeed, it appears that people of all
ages are generally accurate in their life expectancy estimates
[22, 23]. However, it seems likely that logical awareness
of one’s likely lifespan would diﬀer from desired lifespan.
Consistent with this notion, Cicirelli [5] had participants
report the number of years they thought they would live and
number of years they would like to live. Results indicated
thatmid-oldadults(75–84),althoughprobabilisticallycloser
to death, reported a greater discrepancy between the twoJournal of Aging Research 3
estimates, suggesting they wanted to live longer than they
expected, compared to a young-old (60–74) group asked to
makethesameestimates.Althoughthisstudydidnotinclude
reminders of mortality, the assessments of both expected
and desired life expectancy provide an indication of the
contrast existing between real and ideal remaining years in
life.
1.3. TMT and Neuroticism. Terror management research
has shown that some people are better able to deal with
death than others. One predictor of responses to reminders
of death is neuroticism, a general sensitivity toward fear
and anxiety, a trait which may leave highly neurotic indi-
viduals less capable of eﬀectively defending against death-
related anxiety. Indeed, persons high in neuroticism exhibit
exaggerated responses to MS, distancing themselves from
the physical body [24, 25] and bodily sensations [26].
Greater defensiveness in response to reminders of death
among highly neurotic individuals is perhaps not surprising
given research suggesting that neuroticism is associated with
greater immediate [27] and longer-term emotional reactivity
[28], poorer coping skills [29], increased susceptibility to a
variety of psychological disorders [30], and greater death-
related anxiety [31]. It is believed that the traits associated
with neuroticism leave this group less equipped to manage
death-related anxiety. In addition to the role of neuroticism
in terror management processes, this personality trait has
also been associated with poorer perceived health among
older adults [32]; it was therefore hypothesized that neu-
roticism would be related to older individuals’ subjective life
expectancyestimatesandresponsestoincreasedawarenessof
mortality.
1.4. The Present Study. The present study examined eﬀects of
death reminders on older adults’ subjective life expectancy
estimates and the potential moderating roles of age and
neuroticism. Bearing in mind Erikson’s [33]p r o p o s i t i o n
that the ﬁnal stages of life are distinctively diﬀerent from
early and midlife, we considered the possibility that old-old
participants’ (73 to 87 years old) responses to MS would
diﬀer compared with young-old participants (57–72 years
old). Aside from the intuitive prediction that young-old
would expect to live longer than old-old participants, we had
no strong expectations about age groups’ reactions to MS,
but suspected that old-old persons are more accepting of
death and would therefore be less likely to respond to MS
with longer life expectancy estimates.
We did however, have clear hypotheses about the moder-
ating role of neuroticism. Based on ﬁndings indicating that
highly neurotic individuals show exaggerated defensiveness
following reminders of morality [24–26], we predicted that
participants reporting higher levels of neuroticism would be
more likely to respond to MS by distancing themselves from
death via longer predicted life expectancies because their
anxiety-buﬀering systems are typically weaker than individ-
uals low in neuroticism, and highly neurotic individuals are
more likely to use avoidance-oriented coping mechanisms
[34, 35].
Table 1: Demographic information and individual diﬀerences.
Young-Old Old-Old Overall
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
Age∗ 66.38 (3.62) 77.68 (3.91) 71.44 (6.77)
Gender (% Female) 60 (81%) 48 (80%) 108 (81%)
Neuroticism 7.39 (4.67) 8.48 (5.20) 7.88 (4.92)
Self-esteem∗ 3.92 (.46) 3.64 (.60) 3.80 (.54)
Positive aﬀect 3.28 (.67) 3.18 (.71) 3.23 (.69)
Negative aﬀect∗ 1.29 (.38) 1.49 (.49) 1.38 (.44)
∗indicates age diﬀerences ≤.01.
2. Method
A between-subjects design was used, with two groups: the
MS condition and a control condition. Random assignment
to condition allowed for distribution of individual diﬀerence
variables and pre-existing diﬀerences in life expectancy
beliefs across study conditions. Although having baseline
data of participant life expectancy could be useful, it was
not assessed because multiple measurement in a short time
period could motivate participants to appear consistent or
tip them oﬀ to the purpose of the study.
2.1. Participants. Participants were recruited from an annual
mature adults’ minicollege lecture series at a liberal arts
college. Attendees expressing interest in participating were
given questionnaire packets to complete at home. Of 160
distributed, 134 completed packets were returned (84%).
Participants ranged in age from 57 to 87 years old (M =
71.44, SD = 6.77). The sample included 26 men and 108
women. Men (M = 70.88, SD = 6.69) and women (M =
71.57, SD = 6.81) did not diﬀer in age, P = .64. (Inclusion
of participant sex did not alter analyses reported; there was
no main eﬀect for sex, nor did this variable interact with
prime, age, and neuroticism, Ps >. 11 for life expectancy
estimates, positive aﬀect, negative aﬀect, and self-esteem.)
See Table 1 for sample characteristics.
2.2. Procedure. To prevent participants from speculating
about the purpose of the study, they were told the study con-
cerned the personality and attitudes of older adults. Packets
were distributed in sealed envelopes, so experimenters were
blind to conditions. Participants were randomly assigned to
either the MS (N = 73) or pain conditions (N = 61); groups
did not diﬀer in age (P = .46) or gender (P = .42).
Participantsﬁrstcompletedthe23-itemneuroticismsub-
scale of the Eysenck Personality Inventory [36]. Participants
indicatedagreementwithavarietyofstatements(e.g.,Would
you call yourself tense or “highly-strung”?) with yes or no.
Yes responses were scored as 1, and no responses scored as
0, for a possible range of scores from 0 to 23; higher scores
indicate greater neuroticism (M = 7.88, SD = 4.92). This
measure (α = .85) served the dual purpose of assessing the
hypothesized moderating variable as well as supporting the
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Next, participants completed the two open-ended ques-
tions for the MS manipulation. MS participants responded
to the questions “Please brieﬂy describe the emotions that
the thought of your own death arouses in you” and “Jot
down, as speciﬁcally as you can, what you think will happen
to you as you physically die and once you are physically
dead.” Control participants responded to parallel questions
(“Please brieﬂy describe the emotions that the thought of
experiencing intense physical pain arouse in you” and “Jot
down, as speciﬁcally as you can, what you think will happen
to you as you experience intense physical pain”). Physical
pain was selected as a control because it is a negative
experience that does not involve death. These questions
increase the accessibility of, or prime, thoughts related to
mortalityortheexperienceofphysicalpain.Indeed,previous
research reveals that MS questions have reliably proven
to increase death-thought accessibility as well as defen-
sive responses, whereas questions regarding pain have not
[11, 37].
Participants then completed the 60-item Expanded Pos-
itive and Negative Aﬀect Schedule (PANAS-X) [38], indicat-
ingonascaleof1(veryslightlyornotatall)to5(extremely),
the extent to which they were experiencing listed emotions
(e.g., interested, ashamed) “at the present moment.” Scales
of both positive (α = .78) and negative aﬀect (α = .85)
had acceptable reliability. They also completed the 20-item
State Self-Esteem Scale [39], indicating on a scale of 1 (not
at all) to 5 (extremely) the extent to which they agreed
with 20 statements relating to self-esteem (e.g. “I feel that
others respect and admire me.”; α = .89). Mean scores
were calculated for aﬀect and self-esteem, with resulting
possible scores ranging from 1 to 5. Although aﬀect and
self-esteem are not typically aﬀected by MS in studies with
younger adults, we included these measures because little
is known about MS eﬀects among older adults. Further,
because life expectancy estimation has not been used as a
dependent variable in TMT research, assessments of aﬀect
and self-esteem allowed us to examine its relationship to
these variables. The two measures also provided a delay
and distraction before the dependent variable to reduce the
likelihood of participants making an explicit connection
between the MS induction and dependent measure.
Participants then reported their gender and age. Lastly,
for our primary dependent variable, participants were asked
to indicate “To what age do you expect to live?” They then
attended a lecture given as a portion of the course they were
enrolledin,whichincludedadebrieﬁnganddiscussionofthe
study.
3. Results
3.1. Life Expectancy. The primary dependent variable,
remaininglifeexpectancy,wascreatedbysubtractingcurrent
age from estimated life expectancy. For example, a 65-year-
old estimating she will live to 85 would receive a score of 20.
Lifeexpectancyservedasadependentvariableinhierarchical
regression analyses with MS condition, age, neuroticism,
and resulting two- and three-way interactions as predictors.
Following Aiken and West’s [40] methods, the MS variable
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Figure 1: Life expectancy estimates as a function of mortality
salience and neuroticism among old-old adults. Note that scores
indicate estimated remaining years to live.
was dummy-coded, and continuous variables, age and neu-
roticismwerecenteredatthemean.Maineﬀectswereentered
in step 1 (ΔR
2
= .39, P<. 01), two-way interactions in step 2
(ΔR2 = .06, P<. 01), and the three-way interaction in step 3
(ΔR2 = .03, P<. 01). For the full model, adjusted R2 = .46,
P<. 01.
Main eﬀects were observed for age, B =− .70, SE = .08,
t =− 8.81, P<. 01 ( partialr2 = .37), and neuroticism,
B =− .22, SE = .11, t =− 1.99, P = .05 ( partialr2 =
.0 3 ) ;ad v a n c eda g ea n dh i gh e rl ev el so fn e u r o ti c i s mp r ed i ct ed
shorter subjective life expectancy. Participants in the MS
condition reported marginally lower life expectancy than
those in the control condition, P = .11.
These main eﬀects were qualiﬁed by a signiﬁcant MS ×
neuroticism interaction, B = .73, SE = .21, t = 3.50,
P<. 01 ( partialr2 = .09), and the predicted signiﬁcant three-
way interaction, B =− .08, SE = .03, t =− 2.90, P<
.01 ( partialr2 = .06). To explore this three-way interaction,
we assessed the MS × neuroticism interaction separately
for young-old (57–72, M = 66.38, SD = 3.62) and old-
old participants (73–87, M = 77.68, SD = 3.91). This
analysis revealed no eﬀects among old-old participants,
Ps >. 50. Among young-old, there was a tendency for
higher neuroticism to predict shorter life expectancy (P =
.06), and the predicted MS × neuroticism interaction was
signiﬁcant, B = .61, SE = .32, t = 4.42, P<. 01
( partialr2 = .22). Thus old-old participants’ life expectancy
estimates were not aﬀected by MS or neuroticism; see
Figure 1.
Among young-old participants, high neuroticism was
associated with lower life expectancies: in the control condi-
tion this relationship was statistically signiﬁcant, B =− .94,
SE = .18, t =− 5.15, P<. 01, but in the MS condition it fell
short of signiﬁcance, B = .45, SE = .26, t = 1.72, P = .09. To
test our primary hypotheses about the eﬀect of MS on high
and low neurotics, we assessed the eﬀect of MS separately
at 1 SD above and 1 SD below the neuroticism mean [34].Journal of Aging Research 5
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Figure 2: Life expectancy estimates as a function of mortality
salience and neuroticism among young-old adults. Note that scores
indicate estimated remaining years to live.
Among low neurotic young-old individuals, MS decreased
life expectancy estimates, B =− 5.80, SE = 2.02, t =− 2.87,
P<. 01. However, consistent with our primary hypothesis,
among high neurotic young-old participants, MS leads to
longer life expectancy estimates, B = 7.93, SE = 2.24, t =
3.55, P<. 01, see Figure 2. The ﬁnding that neuroticism was
generally associated with reporting lower life expectancies
appears consistent with previous ﬁndings that neuroticism is
associated with poorer perceived health among older adults
[32]. However, the ﬁnding that high neurotic young-old
participants were the only group to respond to MS with
increased life expectancy estimates suggests that they are also
especially defensive in this regard when thoughts of death are
primed.
Looked at diﬀerently, young-old participants reported
greater life expectancies than old-old participants in all but
one condition (Ps <. 01), high neuroticism control (P =
.15). Reminders of death seemed to counteract this tendency
by activating death-denying responses that elevated young-
old high neurotics’ life expectancy estimates above those
of old-old high neurotic participants, P<. 01, but still
not to the level of low neurotic young-old participants,
P = .09.
3.2. Aﬀect and Self-Esteem. One-way analysis of variance was
usedtotestforpossibleeﬀectsofMSonpositiveandnegative
aﬀect and self-esteem, and revealed no MS eﬀects on positive
aﬀect (P = .97) or self-esteem (P = .74). Participants in the
MS condition tended to report higher negative aﬀect (P =
.06). Treating positive and negative aﬀect and self-esteem
as covariates in regression analyses did not signiﬁcantly
inﬂuence the reported results concerning life expectancy; the
three way interaction remained signiﬁcant, P = .02. Positive
aﬀect was positively related to life expectancy estimates, B =
.28, SE = .94, t = 3.42, P<. 0 1 ,w h i l en e g a t i v ea ﬀect was
negatively related to these estimates, B =− .19, SE = 1.46,
t =− 2.19, P<. 05.
4. Discussion
The present results suggest that the way older adults cope
with increased proximity to death depends on both age and
neuroticism. Except for those in the high neurotic control
group, old-old participants predicted fewer remaining years
of life than young-old participants. Young-old partici-
pants with lower levels of neuroticism responded to death
reminders with lower estimates of life expectancy. Among
young-old adults, this arguably more adaptive personality
type seems to allow for less defensive responses to reminders
of mortality.
On the other hand, young-old adults who were high in
neuroticism responded to MS with longer life expectancy
estimates. This is consistent with research linking high
levels of neuroticism to the use of avoidance as a defense
mechanism [34, 35] and especially defensive responses to
reminders of mortality among younger adults [24–26].
Neuroticism predicts both poorer perceived health [32]a n d
greater susceptibility to anxiety disorders [41]a m o n go l d e r
adults. This is likely reﬂected in the control condition, in
which more neurotic participants generally reported a lower
life expectancy. With poorer perceived health and more
anxieties, a lower life expectancy may be expected for highly
neurotic individuals. For the young-old, this diﬀerence
between low and high neurotics was eliminated because the
high neurotics increased their life expectancy estimate after
MS. These ﬁndings are consistent with our interpretation of
the MS-induced increase in life expectancy among young-
old participants in the present study being a proximal terror
management defense to avoid the problem of death. As
predicted, high neurotic young-old adults increased their
life expectancy estimates in the present study, presum-
ably because they lack adequate anxiety-buﬀering mecha-
nisms. The present results suggest that, generally speaking,
high neurotic young-old adults have lower subjective life
expectancy than their less neurotic counterparts; however,
reminders of mortality activate the defensive reaction of
increasing their life expectancy estimates.
Interestingly, old-old participants did not show this
defensiveresponsetoMS,regardlessofneuroticismlevel.Itis
certainly easy to imagine a well-adjusted (i.e., low neurotic)
old-old individual accepting the reality of mortality and
being less impacted by reminders of it, as found among
young-old low neurotic participants in this study. The fact
that highly neurotic old-old participants in the present study
were also unaﬀected by reminders of death suggests that
with highly advanced age, people may become increasingly
accepting of their mortality and thus less likely to engage in
defensivedenial.Itmayalsobethatincreasinglifeexpectancy
was simply implausible for persons of this age group. The
implausibility of denial may play a role in promoting death
acceptance.
Taken as a whole, the present results suggest that the
process of aging and the associated more frequent reminders
of mortality provide motivation for young-old adults low
in neuroticism to strive for death acceptance, or at the very
least, sober realism, as reﬂected in their shorter estimates
of life expectancy following MS. However, those in the6 Journal of Aging Research
young-old range with higher levels of neuroticism may lack
similar psychological resources and therefore attempt to
distance themselves from death via longer life expectancy
ratings. Yet among old-old individuals, neuroticism was no
longer predictive of defensive reactions to MS. This could
reﬂect a relinquishing of eﬀorts to defend, or perhaps with
highly advanced age, neurotic individuals develop diﬀerent,
untapped methods for coping with death-related anxiety.
Additional research will be needed to determine whether the
presentresultsreﬂectacceptanceofdeathoraswitchtoother
types of defenses.
Erikson [33] suggested that in later life, people con-
template the fundamental nature of their existence. He
maintained that in the eighth stage of development, people
enteraperiodcharacterizedbyeitheregointegrityordespair.
Hedescribed ego integrity asan acceptanceof thelife led and
awarenessthatdeathisanaturalpartoflife;theseindividuals
would presumably respond less defensively to reminders of
mortality. Others may experience despair, characterized by
fearfulness that life is coming to a close and an inability
to identify a coherent sense of purpose and/or achievement
in their lives. Although a direct measurement of Erikson’s
concepts of ego integrity and despair was not included in
the present study, persons with high levels of neuroticism
seem less likely to achieve ego integrity. Erikson’s suggestion
that despair is characterized by fearfulness, some of which is
speciﬁctodeath[33],andresearchlinkingneuroticismtothe
fear of death [31], are consistent with the possibility that a
lack of ego integrity among high neurotics might play a role
in the present results. Indeed, young-old participants high
in neuroticism displayed defensive distancing from death
that might reﬂect what Erikson identiﬁed as a lack of ego
integrity. Conversely, people with lower levels of neuroticism
predicted shorter life spans following reminders of death,
implying the potential acceptance of life’s end.
The present ﬁndings suggest that with truly advanced
age, such as the old-old participants in the present study,
neuroticism no longer predicts responses to MS. Joan
Erikson’s subsequent addition of a ninth stage [42]m a y
help explain this diminishing role of neuroticism toward
the end of life. In the proposed ninth stage, which emerges
in very old age, individuals must cope with the extreme
physical changes experienced in the late 80s and beyond.
During this stage, people consider the larger meaning of life,
rather than focusing on one’s own individual life. Erikson
described this as a time involving serious reﬂection on
personal death, which may include acute awareness of the
likely causes of one’s own passing. It may be that at this point
in development, even neurotic individuals move toward
greater acceptance of death.
It is important to point out, though, that the old-
old group in the present study was largely composed of
individuals slightly younger than those expected to be in
the ninth stage as deﬁned by Erikson (20 participants were
80 and older, and 4 were 85 and older). It seems likely,
though, that the transition toward this ninth stage of death
acceptanceisagradualprocessthatbeginsbeforethelate80s;
indeed, Erikson [33] was clear that the ages speciﬁed were
general guidelines, that varied across persons, and that the
process of moving from stage to stage is a gradual process
rather than a discrete transition. The present ﬁnding that
neuroticism predicts defensive responses to MS in young-
old but not old-old adults, suggests that advancing age
may encourage changes in coping even among neurotic
persons who were resistant to such changes in their younger
years.
4.1. Limitations and Future Directions. Due to the fact that
the study was conducted in a large group as part of an
educational program, we were unable to conduct cognitive
screens. It would be helpful to be able to link participants’
results to their level of cognitive functioning, or at least have
deﬁnitive information showing that cognitive functioning
was not playing a role in the present results. Health
information could also be of interest regarding its impact
on life expectancy estimates, as subjective health ratings have
been shown to predict desired length of life expectancy [22].
We feel conﬁdent that the individuals participating in this
study were highly functioning and healthy older adults, as all
wereparticipatinginalectureseriesinvolvingtransportation
to campus and attendance at three lectures a day, one day
per week, over the course of 6 weeks. Participants also
initiated participation in the study and were actively engaged
in the educational program at which they were recruited.
Indeed, the high functioning nature of our sample most
likely oﬀers a picture of healthy aging processes, which
may limit the generalizability of our results to less healthy
older adults. Any variability in functioning or health would
likely be distributed evenly across conditions due to random
assignment. Ideally, we would also have more demographic
and personal information, allowing assessment of whether
variables such as socioeconomic status, health, and religious
beliefs aﬀect responses to MS. However, the homogeneous
nature of the participant pool and their overall high level
of functioning suggest there were likely to be relatively little
variability on these dimensions. Further, in previous TMT
studies with older adults, we have not found socioeconomic
status, health, or religious beliefs to have signiﬁcant impact
on results [18–20].
Another potential limitation may be our control condi-
tion. Although research with younger adults indicates that
priming thoughts of physical pain produces eﬀects similar
to that of neutral primes [11, 37], it may be that thinking
about the experience of physical pain is diﬀerent for older,
compared to younger adults, because they are more likely
to have health problems that involve physical pain. If their
physical pain is associated with a debilitating or potentially
fatal disease process, thinking of this pain may subsequently
elicit reminders of death. However, a content analysis of
participants’ responses to the pain salience induction found
that only six participants mentioned death-related problems
orconcepts,andthese werenomorefrequentamongold-old
neurotic participants than the other groups. (Exclusion of
theseparticipantsdidnotsigniﬁcantlyalterreportedresults.)
Future studies should include a wider variety of control
inductions to identify the most appropriate one for older age
groups.Journal of Aging Research 7
Despite these limitations, the present results oﬀer insight
into older adults’ responses to reminders of death and expe-
rience of existential anxiety. It appears that older individuals
low in neuroticism develop some level of acceptance of their
mortality, and as a result they are less likely to respond to MS
with signiﬁcantly longer life expectancy estimates. This may
also be the case for old-old individuals regardless of level of
neuroticism, whose responses are not signiﬁcantly aﬀected
by MS. However, young-old adults with high neuroticism
apparently continue to be motivated to view death as part
of the distant future. This suggests that in the early stages of
older adulthood, personality variables may be an important
determinant of the types of reactions used when reminded of
mortality, but that increasingly advanced age promotes less
individual diﬀerences in these responses.
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